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BOOK REVIEWS
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USES OF OUTER SPACE. By J. E. S.
Fawcett. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. Oceana Publications. 1968. Pp. vii,
92. $3.50.
By its brevity, this book clearly reveals its origins. It was a series of
lectures at Manchester University given under the bequest of Miss Olive
Schill in memory of her brother Melland Schill. Its five chapters reflect
what might well have been the major divisions of that presentation. Be
that as it may, the book testifies to the fact that those particular lectures
fully complied with the donor's stipulated requirement that they should be
"of the highest possible standard dealing with International Law."
On the other hand, the book suffers from the restrictions which time
imposes on even the best of lecturers. It is overly terse and general.
This reviewer regrets that when the time came for Mr. Fawcett to set
out in book form the thoughts he had previously delivered orally, he did
not take the opportunity to expand his material at length and to develop
his arguments in detail. A longer book would have resulted, but it would
have been most welcome, for the author would have done us all a very
great service by further exposition. Nonetheless, even in its present
form, Mr. Fawcett's book is a spritely, original, thoroughly-informed,
stimulating, thoughtful contribution to a literature which, although al-
ready enormous in bulk, is only too often stodgy, unoriginal and
repetitious of other writings and writers.
Only too frequently a reading of many international law studies
which purport to be "contemporary" reveals their writers' concern to apply
some fashionable methodology in their presentation, or to emphasize the
different ideological backgrounds of the major "power blocs" as explain-
ing the very different approaches to international law which are found in
the present world. Such writing treats present-day ideologies as if they
provided the irreducible substratum above which international law rules
grow or wither. To a reader of such books, the enormous technological
changes which have occurred over the last two centuries would appear
to warrant merely a peripheral consideration by international lawyers.
Yet our daily lives illustrate that these factors are basic to the structure
1. J. FAWCETT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USES OF OUTER SPACE v. (1968)
[hereinafter cited as FAWCETT].
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and institutions of our present society, to law, morality and to all
ideologies. They are the occasion of present-day changes in institutional
and personal relationships, and of the immediacy of rising material
expectations. Internationally they provide the occasion of new demands of
material progress, national identity, respect and recognition and th6
means of satisfying those demands.
In contrast with much of the "vogue" writing in international law
of today, Mr. Fawcett has written a thorough and realistic book which
presents technological capability in outer space and scientific knowledge
of that environment (meager as this is) as conditioning the structure of
institutions designed to govern relations there, as limiting both the
reach of action and the intensity of interaction, and as factors which
must be considered in providing legal rules governing outer space
activities with meaning and direction. The authority of scientific necessity
as a creative force in law-making is reflected in the author's choice of
the main headings for the presentation of his subject. In this way, each
major theme was architectonically combined into a graceful unity.
II
The development of legal principles governing the peaceful uses of
outer space was carried out largely under the aegis of the United Nations
General Assembly, whose "Declaration of Legal Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space"'
was the culminating point of frequent debates, intensive negotiations,
and a series of earlier General Assembly resolutions. These converging
and overlapping activities provide, in sum, one of the most effective
examples of the General Assembly's vital role under Article 13(1) of
the Charter in furthering "the progressive development of international
law." Mr. Fawcett joins in the contemporary discussion8 of the law-
creating functions of certain General Assembly resolutions by pointing out
the clarifying and authoritative effect of the 1963 Declaration of Legal
Principles4 and its relation to the Outer Space Treaty.'
2. G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5515
(1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles].
3. See, e.g., R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPUMNT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH
THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS passim (1963); Higgins, The Develop-
ment of International Law by the Political Organs of the United Nations, 59 Am. Soc.
INT'L L. PRoc. 116 (1965); Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General
Assembly, 60 Am. J. INT'L L. 782 (1966).
4. For an earlier discussion of the legal effect of the 1963 Declaration of Legal
Principles, see Goldie, Liability for Damage and the Progressive Development of
International Law, 14 INT'L & ComT'. L.Q. 1189, 1233-39, 1248-49 (1965).
5. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for




The book is steered skillfully between the Scylla of arguing that the
Declaration is "instant international customary law" 6 and the Charybdis
of designating it (as did the Hungarian representative) as "only a
recommendation and therefore not binding"7 by characterizing it as a
formulation of "directive principles"-an analogy drawn from the Irish
and Indian constitutions. In international law such principles establish a
position which is independent of the traditional categories of treaty law
and custom, being neither dependent on the contractual form of law-
making conventions, nor complying with the requirement that they
reflect the "constant and uniform usage practised by the States in
question." 8 Mr. Fawcett illustrates his point by contrasting the con-
tractual form of the 1856 Declaration of Paris' with the general
acceptance of its four rules, including their observation by states which
were never formally parties to that Convention. He suggests that these
evolved from directive principles into customary international law by
being accepted as international public policy by states, and in this guise
applied in the conduct of affairs.
The author proposes an interesting touchstone for determining
whether a precept is a rule of law or a directive principle "only."' 10
It may be viewed as the former if it is "self-executing."" To qualify it
must comply with two conditions. It must be reasonably precise, and it
may not be dependent upon further implementation by states to transform
it into a rule of international law. This reference to directive principles
for an understanding of the significance of General Assembly resolutions,
and the adoption of analogies from the constitutional law dichotomy
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties for determining
the status of a precept as a rule of law or as a directive principle are
original and important contributions. On the other hand, they may
induce an over-simplified view of the role of General Assembly resolutions
in the process of law-creation." The political consensus which underlies
at least some of the most significant resolutions, including the 1963
Declaration of Legal Principles, and provides one basis for creating
beliefs and expectations as to what may be permissible, or impermissible,
6. Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" Interational
Customary Law?, INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23 (1965).
7. FAWCETT 9.
8. Asylum Case, [1950] I.CJ. 266, 276.
9. April 16, 1856, 15 Martens Nouveau Recueil 791 (ser. 1), 7 J. MooRE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 561 (1906).
10. FAWCErr 11.
11. Id. 12.
12. It should be pointed out that Mr. Fawcett does indeed build into his thesis an
acceptance of the central role of politics, assent, and authority. See, e.g., FAWC=T 6-8.
On the other hand, he does not appear to build these elements into a presentation of the
Assembly's role in the process of authoritative and law-creating functions.
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is also a factor which should not be left out of account.13 Over and above
these disparate elements, certain rules may exhibit a generality of ad-
herence through conduct, declarations, General Assembly affirmations
and development of domestic legal doctrines as to represent not merely
customary international law, but what this writer has called elsewhere a
droit international commun or common law in the deepest sense. 4 Be
this excursus as it may, Mr. Fawcett sees the 1963 Declaration of Legal
Principles as reflecting the task of the General Assembly under Article
13(1) of the Charter to promote the progressive development of inter-
national law, but as dependent upon further implementation by the treaty
process. Thus, it at least qualifies as a directive principle, and is of more
consequence than a mere "recommendation."
The book then reviews the Outer Space Treaty to determine its
effectiveness in transforming the Declaration from directive principles
into international law rules. Mr. Fawcett rightly judges the Treaty to be
weak, ill-constructed and incapable of adding specificity to the Declara-
tion. In addition, he points out that it is rigidly contractual in form and in
essence a bilateral arrangement between the principal space users. These
defects justify his apprehension that it may frustrate the reception of the
Declaration (as a set of directive principles) as "forming a part of an
international ordre public to which States should strive to make their
policies conform."' 5
III
One contradiction science has created for traditional international
law theories of territorial jurisdiction stems from the counterpoint of
the motions of orbiting satellites and of the Earth. No matter what model
of the place of the Earth in the universe is used (be it that of a motion-
less Earth in a revolving hollow sphere of space-the hypothesis of some
forms of navigating on the Earth's surface by reference to stars and
planets-or that of a revolving earth in a stationary volume of space-
this is as much a scientific fiction as is the former model), the volume
13. See Falk, supra note 3, at 786. See also id. for his distinction between thejurisprudential basis for incorporating particular resolutions "into the framework of an
evolving system and science of international law" and "determining the effective limits
of Assembly competence to influence behavior through resolutions."
14. Goldie, The International Law Commission and the Progressive Development
of International Law, 28 FED. B.J. 25, 33-34 (1968); Goldie, A Problem of Double
Classification in International Law, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 216, 240-48 (1962); and
Goldie, Some Conments on Gidel's Views, 3 U.W. Ausmr. L. REv. 115-21 (1954).
15. FAwcETT 16. The practicality of this argument is illustrated by Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., 22 I.L.R. 23, 40 (Civ. Ct., Rome 1954). The court applied,
as international public policy, the General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sover-
eignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 17,
15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1952).
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of space forming the environment of the satellite is still constantly
changing relative to the surface of the earth and hence to the territorial
jurisdictions of the states of the world. Thus, outer space remains beyond
the scope of state appropriation, not so much on the basis of value
judgments and traditions similar to those which today underpin the
freedom of the seas," as on the basis of the meaninglessness (in terms of
empirical science) of states' attempts to appropriate volumes of outer
space. On the other hand, Article 1 of the Chicago Air Convention7
recognizes that states enjoy "sovereignty" over superjacent air space
(although the author rightly points out that a better term would be
"exclusive jurisdiction and control" because of the possibility of interpret-
ing "sovereignty" as importing into itself both dominium and imperium).
Clearly, the long-shirked task of determining the interface of air
space and outer space, or of aviation and space activities, can no longer
be put aside. Mr. Fawcett faces this difficult and unpopular problem. He
takes as his starting point the proposition that:
[T]hough the upper limit of exclusive jurisdiction and control
may be set lower, it cannot now be regarded as higher, than the
effective orbiting altitude of Earth satellites."
Having reviewed the "von K6rm~n line" as possibly providing the
needed formula for determining the demarcation, he suggests that a
generalized formulation of the needed demarcation be established by
"declaring the boundary of outer space to be a sphere with its center at
the center of the Earth, and at a distance from the surface equal to the
lowest perigee altitude of spacecraft in effective orbit around the Earth."'"
Positions generally resembling this one, in general terms, are gaining
support, and rightly so."
16. See, e.g., Convention on the High Seas, art. 2, done April 29, 1958, [1962]
2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, and see discussion in Goldie, The
Contents of Davy Jones's Locker-A Proposed Regime for the Seabed and Subsoil, 22
RUTGERS L. REv. 1 passim and especially 48-53 (1967).
17. Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature at Chicago,
Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
18. FAWCETr 19-20.
19. FAWCETT 23. (Author's italics).
20. FAWCETT 23. (footnote omitted). The author defines perigee and apogee as
follows:
Perigee is the point in the orbit around the Earth, of the Moon or an
artificial satellite, at which the body makes its closest approach to the Earth;
apogee is the point in the orbit of greatest distance.
Id.
21. See, e.g., the second paragraph of the Resolution entitled "Space Law" of the
53rd Biennial Conference of the International Law Association at Buenos Aires, on
August 30, 1968; Goldie, Memorandum on S.3305 and S.3306, 90th Congress, 2d Session,
Hearings on S.33o5 and S.33o6 Before the Subcommittee on Improvement in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. 143 (1968).
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The freedom of outer space raises fundamental questions, especially
because both the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles and the Outer
Space Treaty purport to assure this freedom to humanity. Clearly, claims
of national appropriation are prohibited. But what regimes should then
govern such planetoids as Eros, Hermes, Icarus and others? Or what
tenures should assure security to permanent installations on the Moon or
Mars? Could expectations be justified that stores of a fuel won on one
or another of these entities could be available exclusively for future
return flights in a continuing enterprise or series of enterprises under-
taken by one nation? What of emergency stocks of fuels and rations
which might be placed on a celestial body? One quality of the tenures
under which stations may be established is already clear. They are
determinable in the event of unlawful use.22 At the outset it is clear that
conduct inconsistent with the Principles and Purposes of the United
Nations Charter, with the qualifications called for in Article 4, and in
the Outer Space Treaty constitute unlawful use and thus should terminate
a state's title to a station. This reviewer would urge, furthermore, that
the time is ripe for the further clarification of such unlawful acts.
IV
Scientific developments in outer space hardware provide not only
new weapons but also new dimensions in military strategy. These have,
in their turn, stimulated the development of a diplomatic language of
hazy generalities which, in this reviewer's opinion, at least, well illustrates
de Rochefoucauld's cynical epigram "Man invented speech in order to
deceive his fellows." The legerdemain with which such terms as "non-
aggressive," "peaceful," "security," "non-military," "demilitarization"
and "research" are manipulated to allow claims and to reject the demands
of others is commonplace to any reader of the daily newspapers. The
book's chapter on "Force" faithfully details the chaos of the traditional
verbal means of establishing and measuring relations which the new
scientific and technological discoveries have created. Clearly, Article 51
of the United Nations Charter provides no panacea. It is necessary, first,
to rely on Articles 2 (4) and 4 of the United Nations Charter and then
upon action under Chapter VII, and especially Articles 39, 41 and 42,
for example, for the diversion or destruction (or both) of a hostile
orbiting satellite. In the long run, however, we must look to the restruc-
Cf. A. HALEY, SPACE LAW AN GOVERNMENT 116 (1963); David Davies Memorial
Institute of International Studies, Draft Code of Riles on the Exploration
and Use of Outor Space in BRITISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE
LAW, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN SPAcE-A SY, IPosIUM 123 (Brit. Inst. Int'l and Comp.
L., Int'l L. Series No. 6, 1966).
22. FAwcETT 42.
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turing of relations and the creation of new institutions adapted to the
creative and fulfilling, rather than the destructive and stultifying, uses
of the new discoveries of the space sciences. This is the topic of the last
two chapters. They relate first to Organization and then to Order.
V
In turning his attention from force to order, Mr. Fawcett first
examines that essential intermediate stage, organization. The chaos
which could spring from the awesome power which space sciences and
technologies place in human hands can only be reduced to order by the
development of international and supranational arrangements operating
on a global scale. In addition, their complexity calls for a continuation
and development of the industrial framework from which they have
sprung. Chapter IV is thus largely devoted to the "legal aspects of the
organization of space activities, and particularly to space communica-
tions."2 In addition to discussing entities which have been formed to
facilitate international co-operation in space communications, launcher and
research activities, Mr. Fawcett criticizes the shortcomings of Articles 6
and 7 of the Outer Space Treaty and puts forward some very important
proposals regarding the liability of states participating in such inter-
national co-operative ventures.
He points out that the International Court of Justice has already
established the rights of an international agency to espouse independently
a claim for injuries to its personnel,24 and has recognized that such an
entity may have equivalent duties.25 It has also directly ruled that an
agency may be held liable to pay liquidated contractual obligations. There
seems to be no reason, therefore, against imposing a primary liability for
harms caused by the outer space activities of an international agency or
a consortium of states established to engage in research, launcher or com-
munications activities upon that entity as a separate and distinct bearer of
rights and duties, rather than imposing such liability jointly and severally
upon its member states as the Treaty (as well as the 1963 Declaration of
Legal Principles) would now require. In addition, Mr. Fawcett very
practically suggests that international law might well find a place for the
limited liability of the participating states in such enterprises. For this
important suggestion he finds authority in Judge Moreno Quintana's
dissent in the Certain Expenses Case.26
23. Id. 43.
24. Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations, [1949] I.C.J. 174.
25. The Court held, id. at 179, that the United Nations was "capable of possessing
international rights and duties" (emphasis added). See FAwcETT 6 n.2 and 46.
26. FAWCETT 46. See [1962] I.C.J. 151, 248.
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This reviewer regrets the omission of one topic-in his view of
great importance, although de lege ferenda. Clearly, the Outer Space
Treaty has not spelled out in detail many of the legislative potentialities
of the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles. One important area, it is
submitted, for such an implementation is the formulation of the concrete
terms of an international institution to be established to ensure the peace-
ful uses of outer space and to provide guidelines for the control of arms
there. Perhaps the Chapter on Organization might well have set out such a
blueprint?
VI
The final Chapter, entitled "Order," searches behind the problems
of organization for principles of conservation, protection, and responsi-
bility. 'Mr. Fawcett sees the atmosphere and the radio frequency spectrum
as vital natural resources. He rejects the McDougal balancing of social
damage and social utility on the ground that such a process can only give
a practical result when applied within limited magnitudes. And in dis-
cussing Professor McDougal's contexual approach to the use of nuclear
weapons in terms of opposing the "disproportionate and unnecessary
destruction of values" against "stringent necessity" and much larger
military advantage, he asks:
To what is the destruction disproportionate and how can
there be a real balancing when necessity is one of the terms ?2"
Instead, the author looks to the Trial Smelter Award" and the
Lac Lanoux Arbitral Award2 9 to establish an absolute responsibility to
prevent pollution and contamination by those who use the common
property, but increasingly scarce and therefore precious, resources of
all mankind."0
Pointing out that law is both a model of conduct and of explanation,
Mr. Fawcett presents the international law of outer space as calling us
all back to the prime source of international law, the law of nature. For
27. FAWCETT 65. This is, of course, responsive to M. McDouGAL & F. FELICIANO,
LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 663 (1961); McDougal and Schlei, The
H-Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.. 648, 691
(1955), reprinted in M. McDouGiL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
763 (1960).
28. 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905, 1938 (1938 and 1941).
29. 12 U.N.R.I.A.A. 281 (1957).
30. In this the author is in agreement with the theme expressed by this reviewer
in his Liability for Damage study, supra note 4. Such a development in international
law is necessary if we are to survive the pressures of population, technological advance
and rising expectations of living standards, and build a society which can effectively
adjust to them. Nevertheless, only too many international lawyers treat this issue of
legal change as either incomprehensible or no more than an unjustified pipe-dream.
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the present limits and future possibilities of science limit international
law's explanatory function, and the law of nature demands that man must
respect and understand his natural environment. If he does not, "he will
be destroyed-naturam furca expellas, tamen usque recurret."'
This is clearly a book which should be in the private libraries of all
lawyers. In addition, it is one of those few books which lawyers can
recommend with pride to scientists and technologists.
L. F. E. GOLDIEt
31. FAWCETT 67.
?Visiting Professor of Law, Rutgers The State University School of Law.
